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Abstract: This study examines how board characteristics interact with quality of environmental 
reporting. Data obtained from twenty one environmentally sensitive firms was analysed using logistic 
regression. Content analysis was utilised to identify firms that disclose qualitative environmental 
reports. All investigated board dynamics except for gender mix were ascertained to have significant 
impact on environmental reporting. We identify an inverse relationship between board size and 
environmental reporting. The study offers revelation on the implications of board mechanisms on 
environmental concerns and recommends further investigation into other explanatory factors 
exogenous to the model employed in this study. 
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1 Introduction  
In recent years, adverse environmental effect of economic development has 
become matter of great public concern all over the world.  Businesses and 
corporations all over the world are increasingly being made to account for the 
impact of their activities on the environment (Adekoya and Ekpenyong, 2009). 
Uwalomwa (2011) emphasizes that the increasing demands for clear and hard facts 
about the corporate environmental performance of organizations by an increasingly 
well informed breed of stakeholders have made corporate environmental disclosure 
an essential issue of debate.   
The demand for published corporate environmental disclosure of companies has 
increased worldwide as users of the information become more attentive.  
Ultimately, corporate environmental accounting and reporting has been considered 
by accountants as an important issue. Pramanik et al (2008) observe that it has now 
become a ‘global issue’ with a pressing need to harmonize accounting and 
reporting of environmental costs and liabilities. However, Rouf (2011) argues that 
such reporting does not usually serve the need of the user because managers are 
likely to consider their own interests when exercising managerial judgment and as 
such increase the disclosure gap – difference between expected and actual 
disclosure.  Therefore, the decision to provide or not provide certain information is 
likely to depend on a variety of factors like the board composition and other 
corporate characteristics (Sheila et al, 2012). 
In this light, corporate governance is a factor which brings quality information 
submitted by management (Khodadadi et al, 2010).  Disclosure on environmental 
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issues can be regarded as one of the element of good corporate governance. Indeed, 
according to Hess (2007), the growing interest and rise in prominence of corporate 
environmental and social reporting for achieving corporate accountability is in line 
with the new governance regulation model. 
It then goes to say that there needs to be a convergence between environmental 
reporting and corporate governance for better and qualitative reporting.  Regardless 
of the expedience of corporate governance and its potential influence on 
organizations to engage in environmental reporting, research in this area is still 
lacking (Sharifah et al 2008) 
The objective of this paper therefore is to ascertain if any relationship exists 
between governance characteristics and environmental reporting. 
 
2 Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
The recent crises in the global stock market as well as the unpardonable degree of 
corporate fraud in the Nigerian economy generally are enough to ask whether 
corporate governance activities exist in Nigeria (Oyebode, 2009). A survey by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003 and quoted in the Central Bank of 
Nigeria annual report of 2006 shows that corporate governance is at an elementary 
stage in Nigeria.  Only one third of quoted firms had recognized code of corporate 
governance in place. 
The Nigerian economy being a fraction of the global economy suggests that it is 
illogical to assume that we are impenetrable and therefore immune to the caprices 
and fluctuations of the so called global meltdown.  
The concept of corporate Governance as a regulated practice emerged in Nigeria in 
November 2003 when the Nigerian code of Corporate Governance was initiated for 
public liability companies.  The code which is binding on all firms was targeted at 
instilling basics of Corporate Governance as is found in global best practices. 
In 2008, a national committee was inaugurated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to address the weaknesses posed by the 2003 code of Corporate 
Governance, improve mechanisms for enforceability and align the code with 
international best practices. The result of that committee was the code of corporate 
governance for public companies 2011 alternatively referred to as ‘the code’. 
However, aside the 2011 code, the mandatory corporate governance provisions for 
companies and banks in Nigeria are contained in the Companies and Allied matters 
act (CAMA) 2004 (Part xi, section 342, and section 359(3) and (4)), the banks and 
other financial institutions Act 2004 (Cap B3 LFN 2004: Section 28) and the 
investment and Securities Act 2007 (Part B), as well as the CBN code. 
The 2011 code has detailed prescriptions for companies to follow that included 
recommendation that the board should be made up of a balance of executive and 
independent directors. The objective is to ensure the effectiveness of the board in 
maintaining sound quality of disclosures (Uwalomwa, 2011). 
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Corporate governance practices in Nigeria generally reflect systemic governance 
problems which have resulted to stunted economic growth. According to Suberu 
and Aremu (2010), other constraints to good Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
include an efficient judiciary and unclear prescriptions in the regulatory 
framework. 
However, it is imperative that the roles of audit committees, non-executive 
directors and shareholders’ association in Corporate Nigeria be strengthened such 
that the quality of governance and board integrity is not compromised (Oyebode, 
2009). 
 
2.1   Environmental Reporting in Nigeria  
The concept of corporate environmental reporting was introduced in the early 
1990s and since then it has rapidly gained acceptance as a means of 
communicating and demonstrating a company’s commitment to improving 
corporate environmental performance to its stakeholders (ACCA, 2003) 
Over the years, there has been an increasing need for organizations to voluntarily 
disclose in their annual reports activities that interface between them and the 
society (Ebimobowei, 2011) but this has not been the case in developing countries 
like Nigeria. 
According to Adekoya and Ekpenyong (2009), the inherent weaknesses of 
regulatory framework, inadequate resources for enforcing legislative requirement, 
insufficient environmental awareness and advocacy, absence of reputable 
professional bodies and environmental rights groups and inadequate commitment 
to acceptable environmental performance by Nigerian companies have been 
identified as the factors responsible for poor corporate environmental performance 
and reporting in Nigeria. 
Iyoha (2010) argues that the concern of organizations in Nigeria is profit making 
and dividend payment and as such lesser attention is given to environmental 
matters.  However, the by-products and after effects of industrial activities in 
Nigeria has triggered the establishment of the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency and the National Environmental Standard and Regulatory Enforcement 
Agency. Both agencies have been charged with the responsibility of ensuring that 
industrial activities do not negatively impact the environment and also initiating 
control measures. 
Regardless of the establishment of these agencies, it is expedient that the Nigerian 
Government goes beyond this to enforcing the maintenance of scorecards on 
environmental issues by organizations (Asechemie, 1996). There should exist, 
accounting standards specifying how such scorecards are reported or reflected. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Underpinnings 
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One of the best ways to reduce the agency cost that arises from separation of 
ownership and control is the implementation of good corporate governance (Judge 
et al, 2003). According to Cheung and Chan (2004), a major tool for reducing such 
cost and also for monitoring management is sound information disclosure. This 
explains the agency theory.  
Another most frequently cited theory in social and environmental reporting studies 
is the legitimacy theory (Gray et al, 1995). The theory rationalizes the basics and 
practice of environmental reporting by companies. ‘Legitimacy’ exists when there 
is concordance between the expectations of the society and operations of the 
organization. Uwalomwa and Uadiale (2011) in their study assert that the 
explanation for this trend is not unconnected with business organizations’ desire to 
create, maintain or repair their societal legitimacy.  The legitimacy theory argues 
that companies will offer information bordering around its activities to society 
including environmental information (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). According to O’ 
Donovan ( 2002), this could better be done by using environmental reporting so as 
to gain a reputable image and acknowledgement by society. 
Other researchers that have agreed to the supremacy of the legitimacy theory as a 
more profound explanation to environmental reporting include (Walden and 
Schwartz, 1997; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; and Hooghienstra, 2000). 
The resource dependency theory also underpins the importance of board structure 
on environmental concerns. The theory considers management as a resource that 
influences the environment. It posits further that non-executive board members will 
provide more information and legitimacy to the board (Johnson et al, 1996). 
Other theories that corroborate the value of social and environmental accounting 
disclosure research works are inter alia the stakeholder theory (Guthrie and Parker, 
1990) and the institutional theory (Cornier et al, 2005) 
However, being streamlined by the Agency, legitimacy, and resource dependency 
theories, this study attempts to establish the effect of board composition on 
environmental reporting of selected firms. 
 
2.3 Prior Research Studies/Hypotheses Development 
Published studies that linked board size and voluntary disclosure of corporate 
environmental information are still evolving.  A study by Trotman and Bradley 
(1981) found a positive association between board size and environmental 
responsibility disclosures.  Halme and Huse (1997), found no significant 
association between the number of board members and the tendency for companies 
to report on the environment. 
A similar result was found by Cheng and Courtenay (2004) in which environmental 
reporting (as a voluntary disclosure) was found to have no relationship with board 
size.  Uwalomwa et al (2011) documented a negative impact of the board size on 
organization’s environmental performance and reporting. 
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The Agency theory presupposes that a moderate board size has an optimal capacity 
to monitor the decision of the management with regards to information disclosure.  
The findings of Byard et al (2006) are in line with theoretical expectations.  They 
revealed that financial disclosure decreases with board size. Fulfilling the 
proposition of the agency theory, we hypothesize that:- 
H1: There is a negative relationship between board size and environmental 
reporting quality. 
 The state of ‘independence’ of a director according to section 5.5(b) of the code of 
corporate governance for public companies(2011) is met when such director is free 
of any relationship with the company of its management which may impair or 
appear to impair its ability to make independent judgment. It is expected that since 
these independent directors are to represent the interests of other stakeholders, they 
will have more influence on environmental reporting (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Ho and Wong (2001), Cheng and Courtenay (2004), 
Norita and Nahar (2004), found a significant association while Eng and Mak 
(2003) and Barako et al (2006) found a negative association between board 
independence and environmental reporting. 
Based on the resource dependency theory, according to Johnson et al (1996), the 
selection of more independent directors will provide more information and 
legitimacy to the board. We thus hypothesize that: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent non-
executive directors on the board and quality of environmental reporting. 
Women participation in all most all the activities around the world is increasing. As 
a result, the composition of the board may not be able to disregard the women 
representation. Ability to imbed diversity (Fernando, 2007) and opportunity to 
achieve competitive advantage (Mattiss, 2000) are some of the benefits of having 
women on the board. Agency theory suggests that a more diverse board is a better 
monitor of managers because board diversity increases board independence (Carter 
et al., 2007). 
Gender composition is not indifferent in the board’s decision as found in previous 
research (Wang and Coffey,1992; Johnson and Greening,1999;Hillman et 
al.,2002;Singh et al.,2008;Terjesen et al.,2009; and Bear et al., 2010).Along this 
line, we hypothesize that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between proportion of women on board and 
quality of environmental reporting 
Mahmud et al (1994), Cornier, and Magnan (2003) and Romlah et al (2002) 
demonstrate that large quoted firms tend to disclose more voluntary information 
(Sharifah, 2010).  Alongside the legitimacy theory, a company that is visible in 
public has a greater likelihood to disclose information so as to enhance corporate 
image and acceptability. We control for firm size because bigger firms are more 
likely to be concerned with their corporate environmental reputation since they are 
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more visible to external stakeholders who always demand for an improved 
environmental performance (Uwalomwa, 2011).  Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets because of its widely spread values.  Based 
on the legitimacy theory we hypothesize that- 
 H4: There is a positive relationship between company’s size and quality of 
environmental reporting 
The general understanding in the corporate world is that environmental 
responsibility is extravagant and does not improve shareholder wealth directly 
(Rose, 2007). Johnson et al (1996) demonstrate that firms that have the financial 
muscle can undertake more social and environmental expenses.  To account for the 
effect of financial slack on environmental performance and reporting, we control 
for slack resources of sample firms. We employ formula as utilized by Bourgeois 
and Singh, 1983; and thus compute slack as  
Slack = current assets divided by current liabilities. As such we hypothesize that: 
H5:  There is a positive relationship between financial slack and quality of 
environmental reporting 
Several works have investigated the extent to which a board’s demographic 
diversity could impact on its social and environmental responsibilities. 
Demographic diversity traits such as age, ethnicity etc have been 
observed(Milliken and Martins, 1996;Petersen, 2000).This study however 
considers demographic diversity as it reflects the number of foreign directors on 
the board. We hypothesize that they bring experience and strategy to the table. As 
such: 
H6:  There is a positive relationship between foreign directors and quality of 
environmental reporting. 
 
3       Methodology 
This study investigates the impact of board characteristics on the quality and 
quantity of environmental reporting among listed companies in Nigeria. 
The Chemical and Paints, Construction, Conglomerates and Building Materials 
industries have been identified as environmentally sensitive firms due to their 
direct impact on the environment in terms of pollution (Halme and Huse, 1996; 
Haslinda et al, 2004). Twenty one companies in the industries have been randomly 
selected for the investigation in this study. The list is found in Appendix 2. 
The study covers the period of 2005-2009. Corporate annual reports have been 
analyzed to obtain both dependent and independent variables. 
A logistic regression analysis has been utilized to examine the impact of board size, 
foreign directors, gender mix and board independence on the quality of 
environmental reporting.  The combinatorial method was employed to control for 
firm size and slack resources in the model.  Content analysis has been identified as 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                      J A M  v o l .  2 ,  n o .  2 ( 2 0 1 2 )  
 
39 
 
the most appropriate method to capture environmental information in annual 
reports (Neuendorf, 2002; and Sharifah, 2010). This study adopts content analysis 
to measure quality of environmental reporting. We adopt a corporate 
environmental disclosure index comprising of twenty (20) established checklist 
instruments developed by Fodio and Oba (2012). A dichotomous rating system is 
utilized by assigning 1 if an instrument is disclosed by the firm and 0 if it is not 
disclosed. Thus a firm could have a maximum score of 20 points and a minimum of 
0.In the index development stage, the problem of the possibility of companies 
being penalized unnecessarily for the non disclosure of information that is not 
relevant to them was addressed. We carefully selected only items that are perceived 
to be applicable to all sample firms. Along the line of Cooke (1989), we read the 
whole of the report before scoring and then calculate the indices as the ‘ratio of the 
actual scores awarded to a company to the scores that the company is expected to 
earn’. Formula for calculating the reporting scores by using the environmental 
disclosure index is expressed thus: 
      nj 
IJ = Σxij                                                                             (1) 
      i =1 
 
Where IJ = total reporting score  
nj = number of relevant instruments for jth firm. 
Xij=1 if ith instrument is disclosed and 0 if ith instrument is not disclosed 
i = 1, 2, 3 …20 
Companies that have up to 50% of the total scores are considered as those that 
disclose quality environmental reports and are assigned a dummy variable of 1 
while those that score less than 50% are considered as those who do not disclose 
quality environmental reports. As such they are assigned ‘0’. 
 
3.1 Data Analysis Method/Model Specification  
The data in this study is analyzed using a logistic regression analysis (with 
the aid of the SPSS Version 17.0) to test the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. This method of analysis is considered 
appropriate since the logistic analysis is a statistically robust method for use 
when the dependent variable is dichotomous and categorical in nature while 
the independent variables are continuous. De Vaus (2002) demonstrates that 
logistic analysis is considered appropriate when the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable. The form of the logistic regression equation is:-  
Logit [p(x)] = log [p(x)/1-p(x)] = a- b1x1+ b2x2+ b3x3+ b4x4+ b5x5+ b6x6 + uit                       
Where: 
P(x) = probabilities that companies disclose quality environmental reports  
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                      J A M  v o l .  2 ,  n o .  2 ( 2 0 1 2 )  
 
40 
 
1-P(x) =probabilities that companies do not disclose quality environmental 
reports  
X1 = Board size 
X2 = Board independence  
X3 = Gender composition  
X4 = Foreign directors 
X5 = Firm size 
X6 = Financial Slack 
Uit = Random disturbance term 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
Table 1 Correlation Matrix 
 constant X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Step1constant 1.000 .481 -.471 .149 .493 -.648 -.596 
                 X1 .481 1.000 -.659 .005 -.027 -.593 -.398 
                X2 -.471 -.659 1.000 .049 -.148 .347 .697 
                X3 .149 .005 .049 1.000 -.023 -.195 -.084 
                X4 .493 -.027 -.148 -.023 1.000 -.445 -.357 
                X5 -.648 -.593 .347 -.195 -.445 1.000 .412 
                X6 -.596 -.398 .697 -.084 -.357 .412 1.000 
Table 2 Classification Tablea,b 
                           Predicted   
                               Quality  Percentage 
Correct 
Observed .00 1.00  
Step 0 Quality 0.00 72 0 100.0 
                           1.00 33 0 0 
Overall Percentage   68.6 
       a. Constant is included in the model 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Table 3.Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E Wald df Sig EXP(B) 
Step 0 
constant 
-.780 .210 13.773 1 .000 .458 
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Table 4. Variables not in the Equation  
 Score Df Sig 
Step 0 variables X1 3.841 1 .050 
                              X2 14.062 1 .000 
                              X3 .639 1 .424 
                              X4 4.179 1 .022 
                              X5 14.044 1 .000 
                              X6 7.058 1 .010 
Overall Statistics 43.823 1 .000 
Table 5.Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi- Square df Sig 
Step 1 Step 42.135 6 .000 
Block 42.135 6 .000 
Model 42.135 6 .000 
Table 6. Model Summary 
step -2 log likelihood Cox and Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 88.588a .331 .464 
Step Chi Square df Sig 
1 10.574 8 .227 
Table 7. Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi Square df Sig 
1 10.574 8 .227 
Table 8. Classification Tablea 
                          Predicted   
                          Quality  Percentage  
Observed .00 1.00 Correct 
Step 1 Quality .00 66 6 91.7 
                           1.00 12 21 63.6 
Overall percentage   82.9 
a. The cut value is.500 
Table 9. Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E Wald df Sig EXP(B) 
Step 1a 
X1 
-.481 .195 6.062 1 .014 .618 
                                               
X2 
.780 .216 13.025 1 .000 .990 
 X3 -.005 .443 .000 1 .990 .995 
 X4 .424 .176 5.838 1 .016 .654 
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  X5 2.630 .693 14.421 1 .000 13.877 
  X6 2.001 .681 8.626 1 .003 7.395 
Constant -19.507 4.424 19.438 1 .000 .000 
 
The classification table (table 1) shows that if nothing is known about the variables 
and if we assumed  that companies did not disclose quality environmental reports, 
we would be correct 68.6% of the time. The variables not in the equation in table 3 
tell us the extent to which each explanatory variable improves the model. All the 
explanatory variables except for gender are significant and if included would add 
predictive power to the model. An inclusion of our predictors changes the 
classification error rate from the original 68.6%. As such, by adding these 
variables, we can now predict with 82.9% accuracy. The model appears sound. The 
overall significance is tested using the model chi square derived from the 
likelihood of observing the actual data under the assumption that the model that has 
been fitted is accurate. The -2LL from the model summary in table 5 is 88.588. In 
this study, model chi square has 6 degrees of freedom, a value of 42.135 and a 
probability of P ≤ .000(table 4). Thus, the indication that the model has a poor fit 
and as such indicating that the predictors have a significant effect. The Cox and 
Snell R square in table 5 indicates that 33.1% of the variation in quality 
environmental reports is explained by the logistic model. The Nagelkerke R square 
ranges from 0 to 1 and is a reliable measure of the relationship (Menard, 2002). Its 
R2 is normally higher than the Cox and Snell measure. In this study it is 0.464, 
indicating a moderate relationship of 46.4% between the predictors and the 
prediction. The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic is used to assess 
the fitness of the model. If it exceeds 0.05, as we expect for well-fitting models, 
this indicates that the model’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable level. Well 
fitting models show non-significance on the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of 
fit test (Pampel, 2000). The Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic in this study (table 6) 
has a significance of 0.227 which explains that there is no significant difference 
and therefore our model is a good fit. The Wald criterion provides an index of the 
significance of each explanatory variable in the equation. Where the significance 
values of the Wald criterion is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected since 
the variable does not make a significant impact. Our Wald statistics in table 8 show 
that gender does not make a significant contribution to the prediction of quality 
environmental reports. This finding contradicts the investigation results of Bernardi 
and Threadgill(2010) who argued that the presence of a woman in the boardhas 
substantial effects on a company’s social and environmental concerns. Our findings 
are also not in agreement with Fernandez Feijoo et al (2012) who conclude that 
women in boards moderate the extent of corporate social responsibility reporting. 
However, the result concurs with the views of Ahern and Dittmar (2011) that the 
presence of female directors has no effect on social, environmental and financial 
performance. Board size in this study was found to have a negative significant 
effect on the quality of environmental reporting. In other words, the more the 
directors on the board, the less the quality of environmental reporting. This is 
consistent with the investigations of Sheila et al (2012) that smaller board size will 
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result in better disclosures. It is also in line with agency theoretical expectations 
and arguments of several researchers such as Mak and Li (2001), Yoshikawa and 
Phan (2003) and Khanchel (2007) that a small board size escapes the difficulty of 
organizing and coordinating large group of directors and ensures effectiveness and 
performance.  The Wald criterion for firm size reveals a positive significant impact 
of size on the dependent variable. This is consistent with the findings of Cormier 
and Gordon (2001) that a larger company is more visible and accountable to the 
public with respect to environmental issues. Exp(B) for this variable explains that 
for every unit change in the assets of a sample company, the quality of 
environmental report  increases by 13.87 units. Also, foreign directors were found 
to play a significant role in the quality of environmental reporting. Our possible 
explanation for this is that a demographically diversified board goes to bring in 
experience and competitive advantage to the table. In line with prior research 
works (Chen and Courtenay, 2006; Byard et al, 2006; and Norita and Shamsul 
Nahar; 2004), higher proportion of independent directors has positive impact on 
disclosure. Our results corroborate this position .Exp (B) demonstrates that for 
every unit change in the number of independent directors, the quality of 
environmental reporting improves by 2.18 units. In the same vein, financial slack 
was also found as a positive significant influence on the extent of environmental 
reporting; thereby lending support to the work of Ahmad et al (2009) that liquidity 
of a firm plays a role in determining companies’ involvement in social and 
environmental concerns. The Exp(B) of this variable demonstrates that for every 
unit change in slack resources, the quality of environmental reporting changes by 
7.39 units. 
 
5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
After analyzing the available data for this study, several associations and impacts 
become evident. Firm size as measured by total assets, foreign directors, 
independent directors, and financial slack has been identified as firm traits with 
positive impacts on quality of environmental reporting. Gender was found to 
exhibit a neutral association with environmental reporting while an inverse 
relationship was documented between board size and quality of environmental 
reports. Our findings agree with much of the previous research that has been 
conducted in studies of similar topics. With these findings, it was no surprise that 
our logistic model was found to be significant in predicting quality of 
environmental reporting. As such, companies that desire to increase and improve 
the quality of their environmental responsibilities and reports may want to consider 
the direction of these board characteristics and firm traits. The effects of these 
mechanisms on the extent of environmental reporting are far-reaching and as such, 
companies may look for any available advantages in these areas. This study has a 
major limitation that must be pointed out so as to contextualize this research. The 
investigation relied solely on content analysis of information presented in annual 
reports; therefore, some companies might engage in certain environmental 
responsibility and report it via other means other than annual reports such as 
magazines, bulletins, or corporate websites. Further study encompassing these data 
sources could be considered for future research works. 
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Appendix 1: Twenty established environmental checklist instruments 
Environmental management 
1. Compliance with environmental laws/regulations 
2. Environmental policies 
3. Environmental audit 
4. Environmental committee in board/department for pollution 
5. Environmental research and development 
6. Environmental performance section in annual report 
7. Environmental spending-fines, penalties and compensation 
8. Financial data on environmental savings or investments/expenses or liabilities 
Impact on biodiversity 
9. Emissions- air, water, noise, waste, green house gas, ozone depleting substances, spills. 
10. Recycling waste products/waste management 
11. Materials, water, and energy conservation 
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12. Awards for environmental vision and strategy 
Fair labor practices 
13. Staff diversity- Employment of physically disabled, employment of women, and multi-ethnicity 
14. Staff protection-Work place safety and security, information on accidents at workplace 
15. Staff training, career development and employees’ welfare 
16. Compliance with labor standards 
Products/Energy 
17. Product innovation and packaging, product life cycle management 
18. Identification of environmental impacts of products/services 
19. Disclosing energy savings resulting from products/services 
20. Disclosing company’s energy policies 
 
